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Tort reform, particularly in products liability actions, has been on the
federal legislative burner for over a decade.' Its latest incarnation, the
Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996,2 came within
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1. See Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Federal Product Liability Reform
in 1997: Historv and Public Policy Support Its Enactment Now, 64 TENN. L. REV. 595, 597-
601 (1997).
2. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). H.R. 956 was approved by the Joint Conference
Committee on March 19, 1996. SeeH.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-481 (1996). President Clinton
received the Conference Report bill on April 30, 1996, and vetoed it on May 2, 1996. See
John F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes Product Liability Measure, WASH. POST, May 3, 1996, at
A14; Neil A. Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability,N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at Al;
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a presidential veto of enactment during the recently concluded 104th
Congress.3 Legislatures in various states have also passed or proposed
reform measures, including limitations on nonpecuniary loss and punitive
damages.4
The ongoing legislative debates have taken on a somewhat surreal
quality; the proponents of reform have based their argument that there is a
"litigation crisis" on anecdote, distortion, fear, and perception with scant
empirical grounding. 5 Advocates for products liability reform have been
quite rhetorically successful in redefining the central policy goal of tort law
away from reducing injury, to reducing claims. Legislators no longer
attribute the problem confronting our legal system to the number of
accidents, harmful products or insufficiently tested drugs and devices
adversely affecting public health and individual well-being; rather, they now
attribute the problem to the excessive number of claims brought by injured
people.'
The Lawyers'Veto, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at A12. A veto override that was attempted
in the House on May 9, 1996 in order to preserve a record on the issue fell twenty-three
votes short of passage. Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The Road to Federal
Product Liability Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1363, 1365 n.18 (1996).
For the full text of H.R. 956, see Symposium, Is H.R. 956 Really "Connon Sense"?:
A Symposium on Federal Tort Reform Legislation, 64 TENN. L. REV. 557, 559-94 (1997).
3. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-481 (1996).
4. For a summary of state legislative limitations on nonpecuniary loss damages, see
Lisa M. Ruda, Note, Caps on Noneconomic Damages and the Female Plaintiff Heeding the
Warning Signs, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 197, 197-202 (1993). A summary of state
measures that affect punitive damages is provided in Thomas Koenig & Michael L. Rustad,
His and Her Tort Reform: Gender hyjusticein Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. I (1995), see also
AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, TORT REFORM RECORD, Dec. 31, 1995 (summary
of state legislative changes).
5. However, for a description of empirical studies that subject the rhetoric of the tort
reform movement to the scrutiny of reality and refute the majority of the claims of crisis and
runaway awards, see generally STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND T1IE
POLITICS OF REFORM 4-27(1995) (documenting use of anecdotes and "horror stories" taken
out of context or presented in distorted fashion as a technique to redefine the public
perception and debate despite contrary reality); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP
POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 11-22 (1995); Michael Rustad, In Defense
of Punitive Damages in Products Liabilit,: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992); Michael J. Saks, Do We Reallv Know Anything About the Behavior
of the Tort Litigation System -and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); W. John
Thomas, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis ": A Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 459, 476-503 (1992).
6. This shift in perception is sadly ironic, particularly in light of empirical research
indicating that very small percentages of people injured by tortious conduct ever file claims;
a small percentage of claims filed ripen into lawsuits; plaintiffs prevail only in a minority of
suits; and, while compensation does correspond with the severity of the injury, compensation
[Vol. 64:847
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In the legislative rush to restore "common sense" to product liability law
by passing measures intended to reduce claims, remarkably little attention
has been paid to how these legal changes might impact the health, safety,
and welfare of particular groups of people.7 The social impact of tort
reform is an important issue deserving far greater attention from legislatures.
Tort law plays several important social functions. It provides compensation
which can restore social and productive functioning and reduce the burdens
on publicly and privately funded health, disability and social insurance
programs. Tort suits often stimulate regulatory agencies, such as the FDA,
to take stronger action to safeguard public health. The legal system can also
prod research into product safety and health risks that should have been
done before the product was marketed. Additionally, product liability suits
inform the public about risks, and thus enhance more informed consumer
choices. Finally, tort suits define and signify basic social values about what
human activities are worthy of protecting and, therefore, can alert companies
to take certain risks more seriously. For example, if society places a high
value on preserving fertility and the ability to bear healthy children, tort law
allows juries to express fully their valuation when this human capacity is
impaired. Therefore, even though much of the impact of reproductive harm
is experienced in ways deemed nonpecuniary by tort law, a company
developing a drug meant to be taken during pregnancy should devote greater
research to ascertaining whether the drug might harm a woman's reproduc-
tive health. In contrast, if the law limits compensation for this type of
harm, that company may decide that such risks are now financially bearable
no matter how devastating the impact on individual lives.
In its carefully orchestrated hearing process, Congress's slight consider-
ation of the social impact of these laws focused on the repercussion of
proposed legal changes for women and for drug and medical device safety.
In testimony before Congress, I and the representatives of some women's
health groups (such as DES Action) raised concerns that some of the
suggested bill provisions could disparately affect women and weaken the
for the most serious injuries falls well below even the economic loss. See, e.g.. DEBORAH
HENSLER, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1991);
ELIZABETH KING & JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC LOSS AND COMPENSATION IN AVIATION
ACCIDENTS (1988); FRANK SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MALPRACTICE (1993); VIDMAR, supra
note 5, at 15-20; PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 109 (1993): Richard L. Abel, A
Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 796-98 (1990); Richard L. Abel, The Real Torts
Crisis-TooFew Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443,445, 448-52 (1987): Marc Galanter, The Day
Atier the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 6-7 (1986): Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV.
95, 144-48 (1974); Russell Moran. Svstem Self-Corrects Tort "Flaws "', N.J. LAW., March 13,
1995, at 6 (reviewingjury verdict statistics from New York, concluding that juries are tilting
toward defendants).
7. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-481, at 25-26 (1996).
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few incentives for pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers to
devote increased attention to risks their products may pose to women's
health.' The proffered legal changes that most directly raise these concerns
are caps or other forms of limitations on nonpecuniary loss damages;
provisions that link punitive damages to the amount of economic loss only
and exclude nonpecuniary loss from the calculation; and proposals to
insulate drug or device manufacturers from punitive damages if the product
received pre-market approval from the FDA.9
This article analyzes these proposals and their possible adverse impact
on women and women's health. Even though a comprehensive bill
containing all of these proposals has not yet been signed into law, a bill
containing several of these proposals has been reintroduced into Congress
this term.'" Several states have also enacted or proposed provisions similar
to H.R. 956. Thus, rather than making the issue moot, the Presidential veto
of the 1996 version of the Federal Products Liability Reform Act merely
postponed and reintensified the issue.
The article first examines damages for nonpecuniary or noneconomic
loss, the reasons that this type of damages has been singled out for
legislative attention, the gendered nature of the assumptions motivating the
attack on nonpecuniary damages, and the implications of particular
legislative proposals for women. The article then explores the so-called
"FDA-defense" and the reasons why an unadulterated product liability cause
of action in the drug and medical device area is an important women's
health issue.
1. LIMITATIONS ON NON-PECUNIARY Loss DAMAGES: THE
WORTH OF A WOMB
Nonpecuniary loss damages have been a favorite target of tort reformers,
singled out as a seemingly easy mark. Under prevalent economic theories
in contemporary tort scholarship and policy, nonpecuniary damages appear
less justifiable than damages for lost income and medical costs."' Nonpe-
8. See. e.g.. The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 565 Befbre
the Subcomn,. on Consumer Alibi rs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism of the Senate Comnmn.
on Commerce, Science. and Transportation, 104th Cong. 164 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings
on S. 565] (statement of U.S. Rep. Patsy Mink); Id. at 131 (statement of Prof. Lucinda M.
Finley); The Product Liability Fairness Act: Hearings on S. 687 Bebre the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,, 103d Cong. 78 (1994) (statement of Prof. Lucinda M. Finley); Product
Liability Standards: Hearings on H.R. 1910 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, and Competitivenessof the House Comin. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong.
43 (1994) (statement of Stephanie Kanarek).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 64-70, 74-76, 86.
10. S. 5, 105th (1997) (this bill is the same as the conference committee version of
H.R. 956).
11. See Enterprise Responsibility.for Personal Injury (Reporters' Study), 2 A.L.I.
[Vol. 64:847
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cuniary loss damages include pain and suffering, emotional distress, fear and
anxiety, diminished quality of life, or reduced ability to enjoy activities that
lend meaning to life. -'2 Damage awards for these losses have been assailed
as too subjective and irrationally governed by jury sympathy rather than
determinable criteria, as well as inherently arbitrary, and not truly com-
pensatory. 3 Economists assert that nonpecuniary damages are not actually
compensatory because providing monetary compensation for an intangible
loss cannot make the person whole in the same way that it can for lost
income. Law and economics scholars further argue that nonpecuniary loss
damages are illegitimate because people do not purchase insurance to cover
them. "
Inherent in these arguments is a value judgment that nonpecuniary loss
is less real, less serious, and thus less deserving of compensation than
pecuniary loss.' 5 Tort law has long been distrustful of emotional harm
claims, fearful that such harm can easily be feigned or is too individually
subjective to be susceptible to meaningful proof and evaluation.' This
value judgment rests on the assumption that the wage earning and economic
aspects of human life are more important and worth protecting than
emotional, relational, dignitary, and other whole-person aspects of life.
Those aspects of life and loss that have a readily available market reference
or price are regarded as more real and important and are privileged in the
tort system just as they are privileged in the market.
These criticisms leveled at nonpecuniary loss damages and their
underlying value judgments are seriously questionable, if not fundamentally
APPROACHES To LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 201-04 (1991) [hereinafter Enterprise
Responsibilit,].
12. See, e.g., H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108(8) (1996).
13. For a summary of the critiques of nonpecuniary loss damages, see generally
EnterpriseResponsibilitvsupra note 11, at 199-217; Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life
and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering ",83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989); Edward
C. Martin, Limiting Damages for Pain and SuJfering. Arguments Pro and Con, 10 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 317 (1986); Ruda, supra note 4.
14. For an explication and critique of the insurance theory of damages, see generally
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniarv Costs ofAccidents:Pain-and-Suffering
Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995); Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Law
Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theoll
, 
of
Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91 (1993).
15. See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A Histor-v, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 814 (1990).
16. See, e.g., Id. at 816-19; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including
Women's Issues in a Torts Course, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 65-66 (1989) [hereinafter
Finley, A Break in the Silence]. For a classic article setting forth the traditional view which
disparages the seriousness or worthiness of emotional distress claims, see generally Calvert
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033
(1936).
1997]
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flawed. The claim that nonpecuniary damages are too subjective has two
related components: 1) nonpecuniary loss varies too much from individual
to individual, turning the tort system into a lottery; and 2) the lack of a
readily available market based reference point leaves no measurable criteria
to rein in jury discretion.'7 However, the first criticism can also be applied
to pecuniary loss damages. Pecuniary damages lack objectivity because two
people injured in the same way during the same accident will have widely
disparate economic loss recoveries depending on the individual's occupation,
income, race, gender, and age. 8 The market assigns widely varying values
to different types of people; values that often have more to do with
stereotype and prejudice than with intrinsic talent or worth. Particularly
when trying to project future lost earning capacity, the calculation of
economic loss can become an exercise in arbitrary guesswork replete with
gender, race, and class based assumptions about the relative abilities,
prospects, and desires of different groups of people. Therefore, the
calculation of economic loss is no more objective or neutral than the
calculation of nonpecuniary damages.
The second component of the attack essentially is the assertion that these
nonpecuniary losses are not fully fungible with money. It is hardly value
neutral to privilege those activities or types of loss that have a market price
over those that are seriously undervalued or not readily valued by the
market.' 9 Money is not the measure of all human value; activities or losses
that are not easily fungible with money are not, therefore, unimportant or
unreal.
17. See Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and
Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 57 (1990).
18. For example, if a young white female homemaker, an elderly retired latina
woman, a black male janitor and a white male corporate manager are all physically disabled
in an elevator accident in a building, their economic loss damages will vary dramatically.
The disparity in recovery of economic damages is due to the vast gaps between the wages
they earn, the amount of working years still remaining, and the disparate social worth
assigned to their various non-wage earning activities such as household maintenance. See.
e.g., Jamie Cassels, Damages for Lost Earning Capacit,: Women and Children Last,. 71
CAN. B. REv. 445 (1992); Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and
Gender-Specific Econonic Data in Tort Litigation: A ConstitutionalArgument, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 73 (1994); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Rebri-n: Searching ./br
Racial Justice,48 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 772-76 (1996) (describing willingness of defendants
to offer more favorable settlements to white plaintiffs than to black plaintiffs, because of their
assumption that juries will be biased against black plaintiffs); Finley, A Break in Silence,
supra note 16, at 51-54.
19. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Compensation and Conmensurabilit,,43 DUKE L.J.
56 (1993) (discussing the conflict between commodified and noncommodified concepts of
damages); Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987)
[hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability] (discussing the shortcomings of universal
commodification and universal noncommodification).
[Vol. 64:847
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The criticism that nonpecuniary losses are not fungible with money
leads to an attack on such damages for not neatly fitting the function of
compensatory damages-to make the individual whole. Again, this criticism
can easily be leveled at pecuniary loss as well. Economic loss damages
really perform more of a substitution role rather than a make whole or
restorative service. 2' For example, damages to cover the medical bills
stemming from a broken spine do not restore the spine to its pre-accident
condition. The money merely enables the injured person to obtain treatment
that can alleviate the pain or to afford substitute ways of functioning, such
as wheel chairs. No one sustaining physical injuries would ever say that
wage replacement and medical cost coverage made them whole in the sense
of restoring them to their pre-injury condition.2 ' Damages for lost income
are an equally imperfect form of restoring compensation for job loss or
reduction in earning capacity. The work that an individual performs often
means much more than the money that the job provides. For many people,
their work, or lack thereof, is intertwined with self-esteem, status, place in
the community, and social networks. These nonpecuniary aspects of work
may be more important or self-defining than the income stream generated
by a job.
This realization demonstrates that those who challenge nonpecuniary loss
as less real and serious than pecuniary loss profoundly misunderstand what
human beings value. How many people would give up their fertility, sexual
functioning, ability to relate to people and enjoy human interaction, and
their favorite activities in exchange for a guaranteed income stream to cover
wages and medical bills? How many would willingly submit to a life
maimed by pain and impaired mobility or other senses in return for money?
Even conceding that pain, anxiety, depression, shredded self-esteem, loss of
dignity, humiliation, pregnancy loss, the loss of a child or loved one are all
real, serious, and li.fe-altering, the critics of nonpecuniary damages may still
argue that the tort system which trades in money should only try to replace
lost funds, or at least determine a monetary price for these non-monetizable
losses. The problem with that argument is that it ignores or underestimates
the social function of tort law-signaling and reinforcing messages about the
aspects of human life and types of people that our society values and deems
worth protecting. Thus, a jury's award of significant monetary compensa-
tion for a sexual assault or damage to reproductive health is meant to signal
20. It is widely assumed that economic loss damages replace what has been lost,
while nonpecuniary loss damages are justified as having a substitution function. See, e.g.,
Croley & Hanson, supra note 14, at 1913-14. When one realizes the limited restorative
power of money, however, any such distinction between the function of economic loss
recovery and the purpose of nonpecuniary loss damages collapses.
21. The assumption that economic loss damages make one whole seems rooted in a
world view that is persistently blind to the reality of the ill and disabled. See Pryor, supra
note 14, at 110-17, 131-36.
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the social importance of the human interest at stake and to make a moral
judgment about activity that callously injures this human interest. If tort law
adopts rules that make nonpecuniary harm less worthy than pecuniary harm,
or that circumscribe the jury's role in responding to individualized situations
with the limiting device of caps, then the law assigns a greater value to the
monetized aspects of human life and deflates the value of those aspects of
life that society may in fact most cherish.22 The law may also be erecting
an artificial, wholly arbitrary barrier to efforts to get society better able to
recognize and seriously respond to certain types of harm. For example,
large tort judgments have helped draw attention to and improve societal
responsiveness to domestic violence and sexual abuse, which are harms that
often are perceived to affect their victims in many nonpecuniary ways.23
If nonpecuniary damages are artificially capped, or made harder to collect,
product manufacturers or other potential injurers will lack incentive to
consider this type of harm and to take steps to reduce it.24 When tort law
favors market-referenced damages over the nonpecuniary, it is also
reinforcing the discriminatory valuations of the market and entrenching the
tendency for higher income white males to receive better results in the tort
system than people of color, women, and the poor.
The value judgments and assumptions fueling the attack on nonpecuni-
ary loss damages are particularly problematic for women, because many
aspects of women's injuries are more likely to be redressed as nonpecuniary
22. The work of sociologist Viviana Zelizer is instructive on this point. See VIVIANA
A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN
(1985) [hereinafter ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS]. In this book, Zelizer explores how,
as children became valued less as economic contributors to the household and more for their
priceless, joy-enhancing sentimental quality, their social value increased, as did tort awards
for causing wrongful death to a child. Id. at 150-57. Those courts that refused to award
anything more than the nominal economic value of a dead child were greeted with social
opprobrium. Id. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994)
[hereinafter ZELIZER, SOCIAL MEANING]. In this book, Zelizer argues that, while people do
not regard money as fungible with various human activities and interests, they do assign
important moral significance to money, such as recoveries in wrongful death suits. Id. at 26-
29.
23. For example, a Connecticut jury awarded S2 million in damages against the town
police department to a woman slashed by her abusive ex-husband despite repeated pleas to
the police for protection. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1524-26 (D.
Conn. 1984). In response to the verdict, the state enacted major legislation requiring
domestic violence training for police officers and mandating arrest. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 7 -294g (1994) (stateand local police training programs for domestic violence); 1996 Conn.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 246 (West) (discussing arrest guidelines for domestic violence); see. e.g.,
Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REv. 543
(1992).
24. See, e.g, Komesar, supra note 17, at 58-60 (analyzing how caps on nonpecuniary
loss damages in product and service liability cases undermine the incentive to prevent injuries
that harm the most important nonpecuniary aspects of life).
(Vol. 64:847
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loss. There are several prevalent types of injuries that disproportionately
happen to women, and cause harms considered to be nonpecuniary loss.
These injuries include: hostile environment sexual harassment; sexual assault
or coercive sexual abuse from teachers, parents, and health care providers;
reproductive harm, such as infertility caused by a drug or contraceptive, like
DES or the Dalkon Shield, used only by women in connection with sex :or
reproduction; and the painful disfigurement of capsular contracture of the
breasts caused by a highly gendered product like breast implants. All of
these injuries can certainly adversely impact a woman's earnings potential
and cause her to incur medical expenses. However, the primary impact of
these injuries is in eviscerating self-esteem, dignity, or a sense of security;
causing physical and psychic pain; or impairing sexual or relationship
fulfillment. Reproductive or sexual harm caused by drugs and medical
devices has a highly disproportionate 'impact on women, because far more
drugs and devices have been devised to control women's fertility or bodily
functions associated with sex and childbearing than have been devised for.
men.25 -These drugs and' devices have harmed women by rendering them
infertile, causing malformed reproductive organs, causing miscarriages or
septic abortions, or causing menstrual chaos. 26
These harms represent aspects of life and human wholeness that either
have little or no value in the marketplace or that society feels most
uncomfortable about commodifying by assigning a market value. How
much is a whole functioning womb worth? Should its value vary according
to whether the woman wants to make a profit from it, as through a
surrogacy contract, or whether the woman has not yet married or borne
25. See Lucinda M. Finley, The Pharinaceuticalhldnstiyand Women's Reproductive
Health, in CORPORATE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN 59-60 (Elizabeth Szockyj & James G. Fox
eds., 1996) [hereinafter Finley, Pharmaceuticallndusti',].
26. The drug DES has resulted in misshapen uteruses and cervixes, an increase in the
rate of ectopic pregnancies, late miscarriages, and the inability to conceive among the
daughters of women who took DES while pregnant. See id. at 61-77; see also DIANA B.
DUTTON, WORSE THAN THE DISEASE: PITFALLS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS (1988); ROBERT
MEYERS, DES: THE BITTER PILL 126-42 (1983). The Dalkon Shield and some other IUDs
caused pelvic inflammatory disease which frequently led to permanent sterility or
hysterectomy, and also caused septic abortions if a woman became pregnant while the device
was still inserted. See e.g., NICOLE GRANT, THE SELLING OF CONTRACEPTION: THE DALKON
SHIELD CASE, SEXUALITY, AND WOMEN'S AUTONOMY 37-69 (1992); KAREN M. HICKS,
SURVIVING THE DALKON SHIELD IUD: WOMEN V. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 27-33
(1994). Hormone based contraceptives like Depo-Provera and Norplant can cause wild
aberrations in menstrual bleeding, ranging from persistent heavy bleeding to amenorrhea,
along with nausea, headaches, dizziness, excessive weight gain, and fatigue. See. e.g.,
LESLEY DOYAL, WHAT MAKES WOMEN SICK 112-14 (1995); PEGGY FOSTER, WOMEN AND
THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 19-23 (1995); BARBARA SEAMAN, THE DOCTOR'S CASE
AGAINST THE PILL 245-50 (1995).
1997]
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children,27 or whether she is economically well-off or on public assistance?
While some economists might well debate these questions with few
qualms, 28 most people. find such inquiries profoundly disturbing, distasteful,
and inappropriately objectifying. Moreover, efforts to translate these
types of women's injuries into pecuniary loss terms reduce the value of the
harm by only examining a scant portion of the ways that these injuries
impair one's life. For example, the pecuniary loss associated with reproduc-
tive harm or infertility might include the cost of infertility treatment or
adoption. However, these items of compensation do not capture the
devastation to a woman's sense of self-worth from being "barren" or
"damaged goods" in a society that. still sees childbearing as a woman's
highest calling. In addition, the pecuniary loss translation cannot easily
comprehend the sometimes fatal anguish that can afflict the relationship
between an infertile couple, or the irretrievable harm to the relationship
caused by the way in which the infertile couple will have to time sex only
according to thermometers and cycles instead of according to passion. Nor
does the calculation of pecuniary loss acknowledge the slow little death that
a woman struggling to overcome infertility can feel every time the period
comes or the latest in vitro fertilization doesn't work. One woman who
could not conceive because of damage caused by DES to her reproductive
organs told me: "Just giving me the cost of adoption makes me feel like all
this is about is being able to go out and buy a child." Despite these
difficulties or discomfort that society confronts when commodifying
precious aspects of human wholeness such as reproductive health, these
nonpecuniary aspects of the injuries are just as real, profoundly life-altering,
and worth redressing by tort law.
Another reason why nonpecuniary loss damages remain particularly
important for women is that the pecuniary harm caused by many types of
injuries that disproportionately affect women is not readily appreciated or
is easily overlooked by lawyers, judges, and juries. For example, when a
woman has to endure a sexually hostile environment at work, and suffers the
accompanying elevated stress and erosion of dignity and self-esteem, her
27. See. e.g., Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins, 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984) (court
awarded varying damages to women rendered infertile by Dalkon Shield based on factors
such as marital status, number of children, and partial or total hysterectomy).
28. See. e.g.. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of
Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21
(1989); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59
(1987).
29. See. e.g., VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 61-65 (1979); Croley & Hanson, supra note 14, at
1872-85; Radin, Market-Inalienability,supra note 19, at 1870-74; ZELIZER, PRICING THE
PRICELESS, supra note 22, at 138-68.
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productivity, work performance, career aspirations, and promotion or
relocation prospects will all be adversely effected. These effects in turn
diminish her earning capacity. Yet until Title VII was expanded in the 1991
Civil Rights Act3" to include nonpecuniary loss damages, many courts
awarded little or no monetary damages to female plaintiffs despite finding
that they had been victimized by an illegal sexually hostile environment.3
Sexual assault or abuse can similarly impair a woman's earning potential
by eviscerating her self-esteem, which can lead to reduced career aspirations
and success. Yet, in sexual battery cases, women are rarely awirded lost
earning damages, even in the few instances where a lawyer has tried to
prove such loss with expert testimony.3 - Reproductive system harm can
also impact earning potential in unanticipated ways. One woman with
severe bladder and reproductive system harm from her DES-caused cancer
and resulting radiation treatment recounted to me about her embarrassment
at having frequently to empty her catheter. Her embarrassment caused her
to shun promotions that would require client contact and travel, to the
detriment of her career progress and earnings. However, her attorneys
proceeded on the assumption that her harm other than her medical costs was
primarily nonpecuniary and had never even discussed with her whether she
had any lost income damages.
Similarly, in a case involving a woman who suffered severe breast
disfigurement from a botched breast reduction surgery, the court described
how her injuries made her avoid human contact and kept her largely
housebound, which obviously would impair earning capacity.33 Yet both
the court and the American Law Institute characterized her loss as
nonpecuniary, and the appellate court reduced as excessive the damages
awarded by the jury. 4
When a woman experiences reproductive loss, infertility, sexual
harassment, or assault, mental health therapy is often necessary. Mental
health services could be compensated as pecuniary loss damages for future
medical expenses, however, this item of pecuniary loss is also frequently
ignored.35
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
31. See, e.g., Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act of 1991, H.R.
REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64-69 (1991); NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, TITLE VII'S
FAILED PROMISE: THE IMPACT OF A LACK OF A DAMAGES REMEDY (1991) (collecting cases)
reprinted in part in H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 25-27 (1991).
32. See Bruce Feldthusen, Discrintinatoly Damage Quantification in Civil Actions
./or Sexual Batter, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 133, 137-38 (1994).
33. See Baez v. Dombroff, 530 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (App. Div. 1988).
34. Id.; see also Enterprise Responsibilit',supra note II, at 202 n.9.
35. See Feldthusen, supra note 32, at 136-37.
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This tendency in tort law to overlook or diminish a woman's pecuniary
loss is connected to the fact that the injuries from reproductive loss, sexual
harassment or assault seem more emotional than physical. Unlike an
external physical injury that can be seen, such as a broken limb, the physical
effects of stress and anxiety or the malformed reproductive organs are not
visually tangible. Thus, their effects are often attributed to a woman's
emotional complexion or fortitude, or to her personal choices about
education, career, or partner. In addition, the effects on earnings are not as
linear and temporally direct as when a more tangible physical injury or
disease physically disables a person from working or forces her to take a
reduced job. The adverse effects on earnings potential from women's
sexualized injuries may accrue slowly, almost imperceptibly over time, from
the way a woman shrinks back or fails to seek certain assignments or a slow
accumulation of too many stress induced absences. This behavior makes it
easy to perceive that a woman's inherent personality is the cause for any
reduction in earnings potential, rather than understanding the reduction as
directly and logically connected to the sexualized harm and its attendant
alteration of the woman's sense of self and security.
Additionally, some types of women's injuries more frequently are
medically regarded as emotional in nature and thus compensated, if at all,
through nonpecuniary loss damages. There is a well documented tendency
of the medical profession to dismiss or trivialize women's complaints of
physical illness or pain and attribute women's ailments to psychological
factors.36 This tendency is especially pronounced for "female trouble"
injuries to women's reproductive systems, such as those associated with
heavily gendered products like contraceptives or drugs taken in connection
with pregnancy. 7 The medical profession has historically viewed women's
reproductive systems as deviant, or abnormal because they differ from the
norm of male bodies.38 Women's reproductive health has been poorly
understood. 9 Physicians fail to listen to women's reports about what is
happening to their bodies and do not respect these accounts as a valuable
source of knowledge.4"
36. See. e.g., GENA COREA. THE HIDDEN MALPRACTICE: How AMERICAN MEDICINE
MISTREATS WOMEN 79-89 (1985); EILEEN NECHAS & DENISE FOLEY, UNEQUAL TREAT-
MENT: WHAT You DON'T KNOW ABOUT How WOMEN ARE MISTREATED BY THE MEDICAL
COMMUNITY 123-39 (1994); DIANA SCULLY, MEN WHO CONTROL WOMEN'S HEALTH: THE
MISEDUCATION OF OBSTETRICIAN-GYNECOLOGISTS 91-101 (1980); ALEXANDRA D. TODD,
INTIMATE ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS
28-36 (1989) [hereinafter TODD, INTIMATE].
37. COREA, supra note 36, at 77-78.
38. TODD, INTIMATE, supra note 36, at 28-29.
39. COREA, supra note 36, at 232.
40. TODD, INTIMATE, supra note 36, at 33.
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These attitudes or gaps in medical knowledge have led to an ironic
double bind for women. On the one hand, the medical field has labeled
normal female bodily processes, such as menstruation, menopause, or
pregnancy, as disease conditions that disable or require medical manage-
ment." On the other hand, physicians either disregard women's reports of
what they know to be aberrations from the normal functioning of their
bodies or attribute the complaints to emotional problems. Thus, women
reporting severe cramping, excessive bleeding, nausea, weight gain, or
dizziness from contraceptives are told that they are exaggerating, being
hysterical, it is "nothing," "all in their head,?' or just a normal "side effect"
that should be tolerated.4 - Numerous women suffering from excruciating
pain, infections, disabling cramping, and profuse bleeding from the Dalkon
Shield IUD were told by their doctors that they were suffering from
neuroses, rather than a serious and very real physical problem that portended
dangers associated with the IUD.43 According to one DES daughter whom
I interviewed, every time she tried to talk to physicians about the implica-
tions of her DES exposure for her present and future health and fertility of
her malformed reproductive system, she was told that she should see a
psychiatrist for these matters. Since she had not yet tried to get married or
have children, her physical deformities were not really considered to be a
physical injury. Similarly, other DES daughters have described to me how
their efforts to deal with and seek treatment for their infertility have been
deemed largely within the purview of psychiatrists. Women with breast
implants have described similar struggles to get their health complaints taken
seriously and not to be dismissed as hysterical women with emotional
adjustment problems.44
41. See, e.g., EMILY MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY (1987) (a study of the
history and ideology of technological medical intervention in women's reproductive
processes); see also Susan E. Bell, Changing Ideas: The Medicalization of Menopause, 24
SOC. SCI. & MED. 535, 536 (1987); Alexandra D. Todd, Women's Bodies as Diseased and
Deviant, 5 RES. IN L., DEVIANCE & SOC. CONTROL 83, 83-95 (1983).
42. See, e.g FOSTER, supra note 26, at 18, 21; Joyce McConnell, For Women's
Health: Uncoupling Health Care Reform from Tort Reform, in MAN-MADE MEDICINE:
WOMEN'S HEALTH, PUBLIC POLICY, AND REFORM 99, 113 (Kary L. Mossed., 1996); Finley,
Pharmaceuticallndustry, supra note 25, at 80.
43. See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 26, at 130-3 1; HICKS, supra note 26, at 17, 27-33;
MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD
13, 107 (1985); Finley, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 25, at 80.
44. See, e.g., SUSAN ZIMMERMAN, THE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF FEMININITY:
WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES WITH SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 128-29, 141-47 (forthcoming
publication, Temple Univ. Press 1997); MARSHAL. VANDERFORD & DAVID H. SMITH, THE
SILICONE BREAST IMPLANT STORY: COMMUNICATION AND UNCERTAINTY 32-48 (1996). This
tendency to attribute reports of physical symptoms by women with breast implants to their
emotional problems rather than to an illness is particularly ironic in the case of breast
implants, since the American Society of Plastic Surgeons had categorized small breasts as a
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If medicine is more likely to regard women's physical problems as
emotional, then tort law will also tend to see some types of women's
injuries as either emotional in origin or impact. Thus, if the tort system
recognizes harm to a woman's reproductive system or sexualized part of her
body, like the breasts, it is more likely to classify the injury as an emotional
injury and compensate the harm with nonpecuniary loss damages.
Historically, women have been over represented as plaintiffs in
emotional harm cases.4 Claims for very real physical reproductive harms,
such as miscarriages, were often classified as emotional distress "fright"
claims. 4  This tendency of the law to view reproductive system damage
as purely emotional in nature is not just a nineteenth century relic. For
example, in the contemporary case of Payton v. Abbott Labs,47 in which
a class of women sought compensation for a variety of injuries caused by
the drug DES, the court held that the plaintiffs could not seek damages for
their "purely emotional" harm because they had no accompanying physical
injury.4' The court ruled in this manner despite the fact that many DES
daughters have malformations of their cervixes and uteruses, as well as
cellular changes to the vaginal and cervical lining. Moreover, gynecologists
recommend as a practice that women exposed to DES undergo regular
medical monitoring and far more extensive internal exams than non-exposed
women.49  Similarly, courts have characterized physical deformities
resulting from breast reduction or enlargement surgery gone awry as claims
for emotional or nonpecuniary harm."°
disease requiring medical treatment. Kerith Cohen, Truth & BeautY. Deception &
Disfigurement:A FeministAnalysis of Breast Implant Litigation, I WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 149, 169 (1994).
45. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 15, at 847; Hubert W. Smith, Relation of
Emotions to lnjuri. and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193
(1944). After noting that women were the principal plaintiffs in emotional distress cases, Dr.
Smith dismissed women's reactions as "abnormal." Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 15, at
847.
46. Id. at 824-34.
47. 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
48. Id. at 181.
49. Id. at 192. The dissent emphasized these facts in arguing that the emotional
distress claim should be recognized. However, even the dissenting justices apparently
accepted the underlying demarcation of the impact on plaintiffs as emotional rather than
physical. Id. at 192-94 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
50. See, e.g., Baez v. Dombroff, 530 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App. Div. 1988); discussion
supra text accompanying notes 35-36. In breast implant litigation, defendants' settlement
offers and juries' verdicts often are based more on the lifestyle and emotional make-up of the
plaintiff than on the nature or degree of her physical problems. See, e.g., Mark Curriden,
Courthouse Lottery: Implant Verdicts Often Depend on Victims 'Affability, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 22, 1997, at ID.
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The ultimate assumption or value judgment fueling the assault on
nonpecuniary loss damages-that the market is the appropriate measurement
of loss and the monetizable aspects of our lives are the most important and
deserving of compensation-is especially problematic for women. The
market is hardly objective, fair, or the only method to measure human value,
productive or reproductive capacity, and loss. Women have been particular-
ly disadvantaged in the market. Therefore, tort reforms that prefer market-
based loss evaluations entrench and perpetuate the bias in the market.
The disparate impact of market-based damage measurement is derived
from two principal sources: 1) the generally lower value the market assigns
to women's work and to women wage earners and 2) the market's failure
to recognize or value many productive activities in which women engage
when those activities, such as household management and caretaking, are
performed in the private realm.5" Damages for past lost income simply
replicate the unequal wage rates of the market, and thus make assessments
about the relative worth of human lives that many people would find
distasteful. As Professor Chamallas has noted, earnings-based damages
calculations "signal[] that white men are worth more, and reinforce[] beliefs
that they will achieve more than white women or minority men and
women."
52
Courts often calculate damages for projected future income or lost
earning capacity by using gender and race based earnings tables. These
tables lock tort damages into the assumptions. that past inequities will
continue unabated in the future, and that no woman or person of color will
ever break out of stereotypical patterns for her gender or race.53 In
addition, courts frequently discount projections of women's future earning
capacity by incorporating gender-biased assumptions about the effect of
marriage and childbearing on women's work force participation, advance-
ment, and earnings.54
Pecuniary loss calculations usually fail to recognize or assess adequately
the productive economic value of women's household and caretaking
51. See, e.g, Cassels, supra note 18, at 445-48 (discussing gender bias in the award
of personal injury damages to women); Chamallas, supra note 18, at 75, 81-82; Finley, A
Break in Silence, supra note 16, at 51-54; see also Nancy C. Staudt, Taring Housework, 84
GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996) (examining how the Federal Income Tax Code treats household labor).
52. Chamallas, supra note 18, at 77.
53. Id. at 79-84. In this article, Prof. Chamallas documents the use of race and
gender based earnings tables and argues that for a court to base a decision on such evidence
amounts to unconstitutional state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
104-11. A few courts have recently questioned the appropriateness of using race and gender-
based earnings tables to calculate damages. See Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771
F. Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'don other grounds. 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 991-92 (D.R.I. 1987), affdin pertinentpart, 863
F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Chamallas, supra note 18, at 98-100.
54. See Cassels, supra note 18, at 8 1-82; Chamallas, supra note 18, at 453-65.
1997]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
activities. For example, if a woman wage earner is injured, the calculation
of pecuniary loss damages rarely includes the lost value of her ability to
clean and manage the home or to care for family members, despite the
productiveness and economic importance of these services. 5 Similarly, if
a family member requires extensive caretaking services, that person will be
able to recover something for the market value of such services. However,
if another family member, more often a female, leaves or curtails her job to
provide this care, neither she nor the injured person will be able to recover
the caretaker's lost market income, even though the economic unit of which
the injured person is a part has undoubtedly suffered a pecuniary loss.56
Even when courts do acknowledge the economic value of household
services, as they are now likely to do when calculating pecuniary loss
damages for the wrongful death or disability of a homemaker,57 the market
assigns much lower values to these activities than their true social impor-
tance or value, precisely because they are "women's work." Wage rates for
home health care aides, child care workers, cooks, food servers and
dishwashers, and household or "domestic" cleaners, hover near the bottom
of the economic scale.
As a result of the interaction of market bias against women and the
depressed valuation of women's work, women's roles and activities are
undercompensated or undervalued by the pecuniary loss category of
damages. Several empirical studies and evaluations of case reports have
demonstrated that women's tort recoveries, particularly for pecuniary loss,
are on average well below recoveries for men.5" These studies magnify the
importance of the nonpecuniary loss category of damages for women.
Women tend to receive larger nonpecuniary awards, especially in cases of
gendered injuries5 9 and, thus, nonpecuniary loss damages can help to
55. See, e.g., Cassels, supra note 18, at 460-65; Finley, A Break in Silence, supra
note 16, at 48-51, 52-54. Under loss of consortium claims, one spouse is able to recover
something for loss of the value of household services when the other spouse is injured, yet
loss of consortium is usually considered a type of nonpecuniary loss. The loss of consortium
claim does nothing to recognize the loss to the injured spouse or parent of the ability to
provide services. Id. at 53.
56. See Cassels, supra note 18, at 469-71; Finley, A Break in Silence, supra note 16,
at 53.
57. For a discussion of the evolution of courts' evaluations of the value of
homemakers, see Finley, A Break in Silence, supra note 16, at 52-54.
58. For a summary of the findings of gender bias in the courts on this point, and
similar studies, see Chamallas, supra note 18, at 84-89; see also Cassels, supra note 18, at
456-57; Elaine Gibson, The Gendered Wage Dilemma in Personal Injuy Damages, in TORT
THEORY 185 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993) (examining gender bias
in the methodology of damage assessments); Jane Goodman et al., Mone,, Sex, and Death:
Gender Bias in Wrongfil Death Damage Awards, 25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 263 (1991).
59. See Koenig & Rustad, sutpra note 4, at 80-87; David W. Leebron, Final
Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 306
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equalize or reduce disparities between men's and women's recoveries.
Nonpecuniary loss damages are also crucial in compensating women for the
gender-specific types of harm that they disproportionately suffer.
Because nonpecuniary loss damages take on magnified importance for
women, legislative efforts to curtail these damages or to make them harder
to recover disparately affect women. The various legislative limitations on
nonpecuniary loss exacerbate the preferred position of wage-based pecuniary
loss damages and, therefore, serve to entrench the gender and race-based
disparities of the market in damages law. Limitations on nonpecuniary loss
damages also undermine the prevention function of tort law. These
limitations artificially deflate the potential value of women's sexualized and
reproductive harms, signaling that these types of injuries can never be worth
more than the arbitrary amount plucked out of the air by the legislature.
These artificially capped valuations reduce women's and lawyers' ability to
use tort law as a means for placing a higher social worth on women's bodily
integrity and sexual or reproductive wholeness. Limitations on recoveries
for nonpecuniary harm also reduce the incentive for lawyers to pursue
claims for gendered nonpecuniary injuries, particularly when the claims may
involve complex medical issues that are expensive to develop and try. This
disincentive, in turn, increases the likelihood that even fewer injured women
will be able to find representation and, therefore, a larger proportion of the
harm caused by an activity or product may go unrecognized. For example,
a lawyer who has represented women injured by the drug DES, as well as
clients injured by the Dalkon Shield IUD and other medical products,
discussed with me the potential effect of capped nonpecuniary loss damages.
She admitted that she and her clients probably would not have been able to
afford to undertake some of her key legal efforts to get juries to return high
damages verdicts for the injury of loss of fertility, ectopic pregnancy, or
pregnancy loss if her cases had been subject to a state law that capped
nonpecuniary loss damages.6"
(1989) (discussing statistical regression analyses which show that being "male" had a negative
effect on the amount of pain and suffering damages).
60. In the early years of DES- litigation, only one case of infertility, unaccompanied
by cancer, was litigated all the way to a jury verdict. Interview with Andrea Goldstein, in
Buffalo, N.Y. (1989). The low $50,000 damages assessment of that jury had been used
subsequently by some attorneys in settlement negotiations as a bellwether figure for assessing
the value of infertility. Id. New York attorney Sybil Shainwald, who specializes in women's
health issues, stated that, in her opinion, infertility is a much more serious injury with
devastating life consequences for a woman than was reflected in the amounts defendants were
offering in settlement based on this one verdict. Interview with Sybil Shainwald, in New
York, N.Y. (Jan. 1997). Consequently, in 1994, she pursued a bifurcated trial on behalf of
eleven women injured by DES, where she presented the damages phase first. Id. The jury
returned damages ranging from $125,000 to $12,000,000 for women with reproductive tract
malformations or infertility. Id. This bifurcated procedure was affirmed on appeal. In re
New York County DES Litigation, 621 N.Y.S.2d 332 (App. Div. 1995). This verdict
1997]
TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
Caps or other limitations on recovery for nonpecuniary loss also send
a message to potential injurers, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers or
sexually abusive medical providers, that women's injuries will continue to
be low value injuries, so that they do not have to make as great an effort to
prevent them. For example, consider a contraceptive drug such as Norplant,
which can cause severe menstrual disruption, dizziness, nausea, weight gain,
and fatigue. If the manufacturer knows that these effects will be regarded
as "lifestyle" or "emotional adjustment" problems and will be compensated,
if at all, as nonpecuniary loss, that manufacturer may decide that paying a
few low value tort claims is an easier course of action than investing money
to research the level of hormone reduction required to maintain effectiveness
with the fewest harmful side effects.
The above observations directly apply to outright caps on nonpecuniary
loss damages. While many states have enacted this direct form of
limitation, 6' and the new Republican-led House of Representatives passed
a measure in 1995 that limited nonpecuniary loss damages in health care
liability cases, Congress in recent years has also attempted other less
obvious ways of limiting the value of nonpecuniary lOSS. 63 One proposal
limited punitive damages to the greater of three times the economic loss or
$250,000; nonpecuniary loss would not be included in calculating punitive
damages. 64 Due largely to opposition from consumer groups and women's
health advocates who pointed out the adverse implications of this proposal
for women, 65 the bill that emerged from Congress in 1996 ameliorated this
proposal to permit punitive damages to be calculated as a multiplier of both
pecuniary and nonpecuniary lOSS. 66 Both houses of Congress also approved
a provision that eliminates joint liability for nonpecuniary loss, while
retaining the usual tort rule of joint and several liability for economic
loss.
67
These proposals attacking nonpecuniary loss damages have negative
implications for women, although varying in impact. Any limitation that
resulted in substantial increases in the settlement amounts received by women injured from
DES exposure.
61. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
62. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 201 (1996).
63. There are various reasons why direct caps on nonpecuniary loss have been
politically unpalatable at the federal level, compared to the state level, including: a more open
federal hearing process; more input from consumer and women's health groups; and the
White House.
64. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 201(b) (1996).
65. See, e.g.. Hearings on S. 565, supra note 8, at 164 (statement of U.S. Rep. Patsy
Mink); id. at 131 (statement of Prof. Lucinda M. Finley).
66. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-48 1, at 10 (1995) (limiting punitive damages to
the greater of twice the total sum awarded "for economic loss and noneconomic loss" or
$250,000).
67. Id. at 12.
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focuses on health care liability will disproportionately affect women simply
because, overall, women consume more health care services than men and
women comprise the majority of malpractice plaintiffs.6 s,
Women have more interactions with the health care system throughout
their lives because many normal healthy aspects of being female, such as
pregnancy,. the avoidance of pregnancy, childbirth, and menopause, have
become medicalized conditions that require visits to health care providers.
Women are also more likely to experience malpractice because of the
unfortunate history of gender discrimination in medicine. This discrimina-
tion has included: abuse of and disrespect for women patients; the tendency
of physicians to ignore or diminish the -import of what women patients
report; and the fact that notions of appropriate treatment, drug efficacy and
dosage were developed on the basis of research and clinical trials that
excluded women. 9
Damage caps on medical malpractice recoveries will also fall most
heavily on. the gendered injury categories of sexual assault, reproductive
harm, and cosmetic injuries. These injuries are compensated primarily
through nonpecuniary loss damages, affect women almost exclusively, and
make up a disproportionate number of malpractice cases brought by
women. 70
Proposals that would link punitive damages only to economic loss,
thereby excluding nonpecuniary loss from the calculation, are particularly
problematic from the perspective of gender equity. Indeed, any such
formula will only exacerbate the devaluation of women's injuries that
already occurs in the tort system .7 If only the economic loss component
of damages counts towards assessing punitive damages, then higher wage
earners injured primarily in ways that affect their earning capacity will be
able to recover significant punitive damages, without regard to the gravity
of the defendant's conduct or the overall health impact of their actions on
68. See, e.g. Joyce McConnell, For Women's Health: Uncoupling Health Care
Refornf'on Tort Reform, in MAN-MADE MEDICINE 99, 110 (K. Moss ed., 1996); Koenig
& Rustad, supra note 4, at 58
69. See, e.g, EILEEN NECHAS & DENISE FOLEY, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: WHAT YOU
DON'T KNOW ABOUT HOW WOMEN ARE MISTREATED BY THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY 13-37
(1994); see generall' SUE ROSSER, WOMEN'S HEALTH: MISSING FROM U.S. MEDICINE
(1994); JOHN M. SMITH, WOMEN AND DOCTORS (1992); THE COMMONWEALTH FUND
SURVEY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH (1993) (documenting inadequate health care for women, lack
of basic preventive care, women's dissatisfaction with their health care and treatment they
receive from health care providers); Vanessa Merton, The Exclusion ofPregnant, Pregnable,
and Once-Pregnable People (AKA Wonzen,.fronz BiomedicalResearch, 19 AM. J. L. & MED.
369, 369-73 (1993).
70. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 4, at 61-70.
7 1. See Hearings on S. 565. supra note 8, 311-31 (statement of Prof. Lucinda M.
Finley).
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large numbers of people.72 Those who are injured primarily in nonpecuni-
ary ways, such as women who have suffered reproductive or sexual injuries,
will rarely be able to recover more than the amount of the cap, no matter
how egregious the defendant's disregard of health and safety.73
An examination of the types of injuries for which punitive damages
have been awarded to women in products liability and medical malpractice
cases demonstrates that the cap would primarily serve to devalue women's
reproductive and sexual well-being. Punitive damage awards have clustered
around contraceptive and cosmetic products, including: IUDs; breast
implants; sexual assault by health care providers; unnecessary reproductive
surgery, such as hysterectomies, performed on women without their consent;
grossly deficient cosmetic surgery; and abuse or neglect of elderly women
in nursing homes. 4 The incentives to take women's sexual and reproduc-
tive health more seriously will be seriously undermined if a potential injurer
knows that the punitive damages for these nonpecuniary injuries will rarely
exceed a readily manageable amount such as $250,000.
For example, A.H. Robins continued to market the Dalkon Shield IUD,
despite mounting reports of pelvic inflammatory disease, perforated uteruses,
infertility, septic abortions, and internal corporate reports acknowledging that
the infection causing propensity of the product could be greatly reduced for
a cost of a few cents per device.7" Indeed, until juries started awarding
large punitive damages judgments in Dalkon Shield litigation, A.H. Robbins
continued to market, promote, and defend the device.76 A.H. Robins did
not urge physicians and women to remove the Dalkon Shields, until the
company was assessed punitive damage awards in excess of one million
dollars in cases that otherwise had low compensatory damages that ayeraged
$1 1,000 to $40,000." In the several years preceding the large punitive
damages verdicts, while the company stonewalled and managed to survive
the low-level compensatory awards, several hundred thousand women
remained exposed to danger and tens of thousands suffered damage to their
reproductive systems. Yet, if caps on punitive damages are enacted,
especially caps based solely on economic loss, companies like A.H. Robins
might decide they can financially ride out the cost of litigation without
improving or withdrawing a product that destroys women's reproductive
health.
72. Id. at 320.
73. Id.
74. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 4, at 53, 61-77.
75. Finley, Pha-maceuiical lndustri, supra note 25, at 80-84.
76. See, id. at 86: see also MINTZ, supra note 43, at 250; RICHARD B. SOBOL,
BENDING THE LAW 11 (1991).
77. SOBOi, supra note 76, at 14-17; Finley, Pharmaceuticallndustr,, supra note 25,
at 86-87.
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The proposal that actually passed both houses of Congress, § 110 of
H.R. 956,78 which eliminated joint liability for nonpecuniary loss damages,
would have had a less drastic impact than the types of legislative enactments
and proposals discussed above. This bill would have affected only those
products liability cases with multiple tortfeasors. It did not cap nonpecuni-
ary loss damages and, therefore, would not have overtly contributed to the
devaluation of women's injuries.79  This does not mean the proposal is
entirely benign from a gender equity standpoint, however. Under a regime
of joint and several liability, when an injured plaintiff cannot collect their
full damages from all parties judged at fault for causing an indivisible
injury, the plaintiff can look to one of the wrongdoers for payment in
full.8" Thus, joint and several liability operates to insulate a wrongfully
injured person from the risk of non-recovery and to place that risk instead
on a solvent and jurisdictionally available, wrongdoer.8 By removing joint
liability, people with nonpecuniary loss injuries will find it more difficult to
collect their full damages, while those with economic loss damages will not,
bear a similar burden.82 Thus, the proposal fundamentally favors economic
loss over nonpecuniary loss and, consequently, raises all the gender-bias
problems of market-referencing previously discussed. To the extent that the
category of people with nonpecuniary loss injuries includes women, then the
risk of non-collection will be shifted disproportionately onto women.
1I. THE "FDA DEFENSE": CONDONING THE TENDENCY TO TRIVIALIZE
RISKS TO WOMEN'S HEALTH
In addition to the attack on nonpecuniary loss damages, the "FDA
defense" or the "regulatory compliance" defense is another focus of tort
78. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 110 (1995).
79. From colloquy and questioning at Congressional hearings at which I testified, it
appears that some members of Congress supported this provision simply because it was the
least unfair to women of the various proposals propounded to cut back nonpecuniary loss
damages. According to my recollection, during one hearing I was asked by a Senator
whether I would agree that this provision was less disadvantageous to women than an outright
cap, as if that was all that needed to be established to prove that the proposal was sound
social policy.
80. See, e.g., Komesar, supra note 17, at 68.
81. See, e.g., id.; see also Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability'Anong Multiple
Responsible Causes: A Pi-ncipledDqfense of Joint and SeveralLiability/br ActualHarni and
Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1141 (1988) (discussing the debate over the propriety
of the joint and several liability rule).
82. See, e.g., Elizabeth Graddy, Tort Reform and Manufacturer Payout-An EarV
Look at the Calijbrnia Experiences, 16 LAW & POL'Y 49 (1994) (empirical study of impact
of similar provision adopted by California; study shows that manufacturers are paying a lower
proportion ofplaintiffawards which means some injured plaintiffs are recovering less of their
damage awards).
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reform efforts that has particularly problematic implications for women.
The pharmaceutical and medical device industries have been seeking
protection from punitive damages for a drug or device which received pre-
market approval from the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). 3
Unable to obtain shelter from tort liability for drugs and devices that meet
government approval criteria through the courts,8 4 manufacturers have had
to turn to the legislature. Traditionally, tort law has viewed government
regulatory standards as a floor, not a ceiling for safety.85 The basis for this
traditional view, as summarized by one court, is:
The warnings required by such agencies may be only minimal in nature
and when the manufacturer or supplier knows of, or has reason to know otf
greater dangers not included in the warning, its duty to warn may not be
fulfilled. Although the manufacturer or supplier of a prescription drug has
a duty to adequately warn the medical profession of its dangerous
properties or of facts which make it likely to be dangerous, an adequate
warning to the profession may be ordered or even nullified by overprom-
otion of the drug through a vigorous sales program which may have the
effect of persuading the prescribing doctor to disregard the warnings
given."
In addition, the traditional resistance to an FDA compliance defense
recognizes that regulatory agencies are not perfect guarantors of public
safety. Regulatory agencies can be hampered by inadequate information or
insufficient testing provided by manufacturers and buffeted by political
agendas, which include cutbacks in enforcement resources and pressure to
act in a certain way."7 They can sometimes respond too slowly to accumu-
83. See, e.g., S. 672, 104th Cong. §103(c) (1995); S. 687, 103d Cong. § 203(b)
(1993); H.R. 1910, 103d Cong. § 6(d) (1993). Several states have enacted similar provisions,
insulating manufactures of FDA-approved products from punitive damages. See ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-701(A) (1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(l)(B) (1987); 735 ILL.
COMP. ANN. STAT. 5/2-2107 (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58C-5(c) (West Supp. 1996);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(6) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (1995); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.927 (1995): UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(I) (1996). Michigan and Indiana
have enacted a complete government standards defense from liability if the product was
approved by the FDA. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4.5 (Michie Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West Supp. 1996).
84. See, e.g., Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). In Medtronics,the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 to the Food and
Drug Law, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994), does not preempt state tort liability for claims
premised on failure to warn and design defect. Id. at 2256-58.
85. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973).
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. For example, the FDA's reluctance to classify nicotine as a drug, and thus to
bring cigarettes under its purview, is a classic illustration of the agency's sensitivity to
political factors. See generally HERBERT BURKHOLZ, THE FDA FOLLIES (1994) (arguing
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lating post-approval information regarding product dangers.88 Furthermore,
the FDA has a limited role in policing how manufacturers actually promote
drugs and "off-label" uses. Congress has recognized in several oversight
hearings that FDA regulation can sometimes be ineffective in preventing
seriously defective and dangerous drugs and devices from being approved
or remaining on the market.89 A 1990 Report by the General Accounting
Office ("GAO") found that of 198 drugs approved by the FDA between
1976 and 1985, 102 of them, or fifty-one percent, wound up presenting
serious health risks that came to light post-approval, as evidenced by
labeling changes or market withdrawals.9"
that the Reagan administration started budget cuts and other attacks on the FDA that have
seriously eroded its regulatory effectiveness).
88. See Finley, PharmaceuticalIndusty, supra note 25, at 83-85. For example, the
FDA sat on mounting reports of deaths and sterilizing infections caused by the Dalkon Shield
for three years, until pressure from Congress forced it to hold hearings and recommend
withdrawal from the market. See id. Although recommending marketing cessation, the FDA
did not recall existing stock nor did it require the manufacturer to warn doctors and women
to have the IUD's removed. Id. at 84. It took another decade before the manufacturer
warned about the need to have the deadly devices removed and, during this ten years of
insufficient regulatory action, thousands of women were injured. See id. at 84-86; see also
MINTZ, stpra note 43, at 54-56, 125-27. The FDA was similarly dilatory with regard to the
ineffective and deadly lactation suppressant drug Parlodel. After receiving numerous reports
of women killed or disabled by strokes or heart failure caused by the drug, the FDA merely
requested, but did not demand that the manufacturer, Sandoz, stop making the drug as a
postpartum lactation suppressant. Sandoz continued to market the drug for this purpose while
more women were injured. The FDA did not act to ban its use by postpartum women until
the consumer group Public Citizen sued the agency. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Drug Will No
Longer Be Sold to Stop Breast Milk, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1994, at 27; David Olmos,
Sandoz to Stop Selling Parlodelas Treatinentto Halt Lactation, Los ANGELES TIMES, Aug.
19, 1994, at DL.
89. See FDA and the Medical Device Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomntn. ol
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. I
(1992); HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, DEFICIENCIES IN FDA'S REGULATION
OF THE NEW DRUG "ORAFLEX", H.R. REP. No. 98-511 (1983) (documenting how FDA
backlogs and lack of resources led the agency to overlook evidence of serious and sometimes
fatal adverse kidney and liver reactions to anti-arthritis drug in clinical trials resulting in the
drug being withdrawn from market shortly after FDA approval); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 103D
CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON REFORMS NEEDED IN THE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND
RESOURCES OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S CENTER FOR DEVICES AND
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH 111, 1-3 (Comm. Print 1993); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101 ST CONG., 2D
SESS., REPORT ON SHILEY INC.'S BREACH OF THE HONOR SYSTEM AND FDA's FAILURE IN
MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION 2-3 (Comm. Print 1990).
90. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FDA DRUG REVIEW: POSTAPPROVAL RISKS
1976-1985, GAO REP. GAO-PEMD-90-15 (1990).
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An FDA-approval defense from punitive damages should be of
particular concern to women. An unusually high number of the drugs and
devices that have gone wrong and become alarming public health problems
have been gender-specific products for use in women's bodies, usually in
connection with sexuality and reproduction.9' Many of these defective and
unsafe drugs have been intended for use by healthy women to affect,
interrupt, or enhance natural bodily processes or shape, rather than to treat
an illness or disease. 92 The alarming list includes:
* DES, a synthetic estrogen marketed to prevent miscarriage which was
ineffective for that purpose, elevated the risk of breast cancer
among the exposed mothers by forty percent, and has caused
cancer, reproductive tract abnormalities, and infertility in the
exposed daughters and sons of the pregnant women who took
it;",
* the early versions of birth control pills which had unduly high
hormone levels that caused strokes, heart attacks, and blood
clots;94
* IUD's, such as the Dalkon Shield and Copper-7, which presented an
exceedingly elevated risk of pelvic inflammatory disease, sterility,
perforated uteruses, and septic abortions; 95
* Parlodel, a drug prescribed to suppress lactation, which has proved
ineffective and has caused several deaths from strokes or heart
attacks;96
91. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 4, at 53 (documenting that most punitive
damages judgments in pharmaceutical product cases have involved reproductive drugs and
devices used in women's bodies).
92. See, e.g., Finley, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 25, at 59-60; Joan E.
Steinman, Women. Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 409,410-
12 (1992).
93. DUTTON, supra note 26, at 6-7; MEYERS, supra note 26, at 93-162; see also
Finley, Pharinaceuticalhndustrv, supra note 25, at 70-72.
94. See, e.g., SEAMAN, supra note 26, at 72-103.
95. For the history of the Dalkon Shield and its dangers, see Finley, Pharmaceutical
Industry, supra note 25, at 77-92; see also GRANT, supra note 26, at 68-69, 74-75; HICKS,
supra note 26, at 1-2; MINTZ, supra note 43, at 25-26. While the Copper-7 IUD had a lower
relative risk of pelvic inflammatory disease than the Dalkon Shield, it still had a higher risk
than claimed by the manufacturer. See GRANT, supra note 26, at 89-90. After FDA
approval, the manufacturer failed to follow up on mounting reports of infections in women
using the device and engaged in an advertising campaign designed to belittle or assuage
physicians' concerns. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (D. Minn.
1989) (upholding jury's punitive damages verdict and summarizing evidence against
company). Moreover, medical evidence revealed that this IUD was particularly inappropriate
for use by sexually active young women who had never previously given birth (nulliparous
women). Id. at 1524-25. Despite this knowledge, the manufacturer heavily promoted the
device to precisely this class of women most at risk. Id. at 1525.
96. Lauran Neergaard, FDA Sued Over Milk Inhibitor: 19 Deaths Connected, LEGAL
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Ritodine, the only drug approved for the suppression of premature
labor in pregnant women, which has been shown in post-market-
ing testing to be ineffective and to pose sometimes fatal health
risks to women; 97 and
silicone gel breast implants, which, despite raging controversy over
whether they cause immune system diseases, incontrovertibly have
exceedingly high rates of rupture and bleeding of the silicone gel
through the envelope, and frequently cause the painful and
disfiguring condition of capsular contracture or localized granulo-
mas.
9 8
This list is likely to grow. The two latest hormonal contraceptives, Depo-
Provera and Norplant, have come under scrutiny for causing severe
disruptions in the menstrual cycle, excessive weight gain, seriously
heightened risks for diabetic women, nausea, dizziness, and fatigue.99
There are also studies linking Depo-Provera to an increased risk of breast
cancer, and Norplant users often have to undergo painful, prolonged, and
risky surgery to have the rods removed when they migrate or become deeply
imbedded in the arm.)°
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 17, 1994, at 9-10.
97. Gina Kolata, Drug to Aid Birth is Found Ineffective and RiskI, N.Y. TIMES, July
30, 1992, at Al, A18.
98. See, e.g., JOHN A. BYRNE, INFORMED CONSENT 9-11, 17 (1996); ZIMMERMAN,
supra note 44, at 121-24. Even Dr. Marcia Angell, who has become the leading critic of the
science of breast implants and connective tissue diseases, acknowledges that they do cause
localized health problems from rupture, leakage, and contracture. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE
ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE
40-41 (1996).
99. SEAMAN, supra note 26, at 244-45; Barbara A. Cromer et al., A ProspectiveStudy,
ofAdolescents Who Choose Among Levonorgestrelimplant (Norplant), Medroxyprogesterone
Acetate (Depo-Provera). or the Combined Oral Contraceptive Pill as Contraception, 94
PEDIATRICS 687 (1994).
100. See, e.g, SEAMAN, supra note 26, at 239-52; WOMEN'S HEALTH ACTION
FOUNDATION, NORPLANT: UNDER HER SKIN 56 (Barbara Mintzes et al. eds., 1993); Cromer
et al., supra note 99, at 687-94. But see Depo-Proveraand Breast Cancer, 5 REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH MATTERS 145 (1995). The media have tended to castigate lawyers bringing suits
against Norplant as fueled by greed and as basing their claims on unproven science. See,
e.g., Gina Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill OffNorplant, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, §3, at 1.
The controversy over Depo-Provera and breast cancer is far from resolved. The package
insert provided by Upjohn states that "women under 35 years of age whose first exposure to
Depo-Provera was within the previous 4 years may have a slightly increased risk of
developing breast cancer similar to that seen with oral contraceptives." Depo Provera and
Breast Cancer, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS, May, 1995, at 145. The FDA approved
the drug on the basis of studies that showed that women taking it had a comparable risk of
breast cancer as women taking other hormonal contraceptives; the studies did not compare
women who were not taking hormones. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTRACEPTIVE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 297 (Polly F. Harrison & Allan
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It is not mere coincidence that a disproportionate number of these drugs
and devices that have presented serious health risks have been developed for
women's healthy bodies. The reasons include: the under representation of
women in medical research; the relative paucity of attention to women's
health problems; the fact that so many more drugs and devices are targeted
at women's reproductive systems than men's; and the gender bias prevalent
in medicine which results in a tendency to dismiss and trivialize health
complaints by women. Ironically, while women's normal bodies, particular-
ly their reproductive systems, have been "medicalized" as abnormal and in
need of constant medical intervention, when these medical interventions turn
out to disrupt normal bodily processes, these risks have been "normalized."
Severe bleeding, cramping, pain, nausea and other bodily signals of
something amiss have been labeled as normal risks, or inevitable side
effects, rather than being regarded as health problems that warrant atten-
tion." Signs of "female trouble" caused by reproductive drugs have been
dismissed because of attitudes about women's presumed irresponsibility,
stupidity, or hypersensitivity.
The attitude that "side effects" from contraceptives are women's cross
to bear in the name of societal good has led to the trivialization of serious
health risks for women. Efficacy-preventing births and controlling
population-has been a more salient concern than safety."' 2 The most
chilling example of this attitude is illustrated in introductory remarks made
by Dr. J. Robert Wilson at a 1962 international conference on IUD's,
sponsored by the Population Council." 3 After acknowledging that IUDs
cause infections and frequently require hysterectomies, this physician then
said: "How serious is that for the particular patient and for the population
of the world in general? Not very .... Perhaps the individual patient is
expendable in the general scheme of things, particularly if the infection she
acquires is sterilizing but not lethal.'" 4
The FDA approved many of these dangerous drugs and devices, despite
signs of health problems in women.' When punitive damages have been
awarded or sought in litigation resulting from these products, the nonpecuni-
ary damages have often resulted from post-marketing or post-FDA approval
actions. Such actions have included: covering up evidence of risks; failing
Rosenfield eds., 1996) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH].
101. See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 26, at 19-36; Cromer et al., supra note 99.
102. BETSY HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS
OF POPULATION CONTROL AND CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE 4-5 (1987).
103. HICKS, supra note 26, at 19.
104. Id.
105. Of the drugs and devices listed above, see supra text accompanying notes 93-98, only
the Dalkon Shield and silicone gel breast implants did not receive pre-marketing FDA
approval. These devices were first marketed before the FDA was granted regulatory
authority over medical devices in 1976. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994).
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to take readily available inexpensive corrective action; failing to alert
physicians and women to the mounting evidence of problems; engaging in
misleading marketing and promotion campaigns; and failing to withdraw
obviously ineffective and dangerous products from the market.0 6  For
example, after the drug DES was proven ineffective in preventing miscar-
riage in 1953, the drug companies continued to promote it for that purpose
and expanded their efficacy claims to include the completely unproven
assertion that DES would promote bigger healthier babies." 7 Thus, for
almost two decades after the drug was proven ineffective, the manufacturers
continued to expose hundreds of thousands of women and their offspring to
needless risk. In addition, after the connection between DES and cancer
was established, the FDA took no remedial action for months and the
manufacturers continued to promote the drug without warning physicians
about the cancer risk until the FDA finally ordered it off the market.'08
With the lactation suppressant Parlodel, the manufacturer ignored the
FDA's request to withdraw it from the market and continued to promote the
drug to doctors despite proof that it could cause maternal death, disabling
strokes, and heart attacks. Sandoz, the manufacturer, also persuaded
hospitals to prescribe it automatically to all non-breast feeding postpartum
patients, even though the company's warning literature acknowledged it was
not safe for all women.'0 9 In response, the FDA took no stronger action
than an appeal to the manufacturer's conscience, despite the FDA's
awareness of the drug's deadly propensities.'" In the case of breast
implants, Dow Coming changed the thickness of the envelope and the
viscosity of the gel to enhance market share, despite internal testing that
showed these changes increased the propensity of the devices to rupture and
bleed silicone gel into the body.' Manufacturers of super-absorbent
tampons have been subject to punitive damages, because they ignored the
compelling evidence of toxic shock syndrome, brushed off the medical
reports of injured women, failed to engage in any further testing or product
modification to make the devices safer, and failed to withdraw them from
the market when it became clear the risk was simply too high. -"2  A.H.
106. See Finley, Pliarmnaceuticalhldust,, stipra note 25, at 65-68.
107. See id. at 66-67.
108. See id. at 66-68. While there has yet to be a punitive damages verdict in a DES
case, frequently when plaintiffs' lawyers have pursued the case for punitive damages the
result has been that the defendants have agreed to settle the case.
109. See Weiss, supra note 88; Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Roberts, Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 14,765, 1996 LEXIS 126 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
110. See Weiss, supra note 88.
111. See. e.g., BYRNE, supra note 98, at 72-77; see also Hopkins v. Dow Coming
Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994).
112. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th Cir.
1987); West v. Johnson & Johnson Prod., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 447-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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Robins's post-marketing behavior with regard to the Dalkon Shield enraged
juries and resulted in punitive damages verdicts.'" 3 A.H. Robin's egre-
gious behavior included: ignoring its own product safety staff who
recommended an inexpensive change to the tail string that would have
greatly reduced its tendency to "wick" bacteria into the uterus; stonewalling
and lying to doctors and the public about the product's dangers for over a
decade; engaging in an active campaign to disparage those who did try to
bring out evidence of the harms; and steadfastly refusing to order recalls or
recommend removal for over a decade despite a mounting toll to the
reproductive health, and in some cases life, of numerous women." 4
An "FDA defense" would preclude punitive damages in situations such
as these where the manufacturer demonstrates blatant post-marketing
behavior amounting to flagrant indifference to women's health. While not
all of the products discussed above were approved by the FDA, the FDA did
approve DES, the Copper-7 IUD, and Parlodel. In addition, the FDA made
the Dalkon Shield and breast implants subject to its authority after their
initial marketing. Each of these situations easily could be repeated in the
future, so long as marketing considerations sometimes outweigh health
concerns and signs of trouble in women's bodies continue to be ignored or
diminished. Thus, it is important to consider some of the unappreciated
salutory effects of punitive damages, such as improving women's health and
stimulating regulatory action or beneficial research.
One of the positive effects of punitive damages on women's health is
that punitive damages have often been the factor that finally convinces a
recalcitrant company to take corrective action. Until it faced punitive
damages, A. H. Robins had determined that it could weather the Dalkon
Shield litigation and could avoid ordering a recall of the product." 5 It
was not until corporate executives realized that juries reacted adversely to
the company's decision not to order removal of existing Shields, despite the
overwhelming evidence of dangers to women of continuing to use them, that
A.H. Robins finally wrote to physicians and advertised to women advising
and offering to pay for removal." 6 This step, which should have been
taken ten years earlier, finally put an end to the carnage the Dalkon Shield
caused to U.S. women." 7 The growing threat of lawsuits seeking punitive
damages was also instrumental in eventually prompting Sandoz to cease
marketing Parlodel as a lactation suppressant five years after the FDA had
first requested that it take this action.'"8 Similarly, punitive damages
113. See, e.g.. MINTZ, supra note 43, at 17.
114. See, e.g., SOBOL, suipra note 76, at 7-22; see also MINTZ, supra note 43, at 17.
115. See SOBOL, supra note 76, at 11-22.
116. Id. at 22.
117. The company did continue to market Dalkon Shields in other countries, where
it did not face the risk of punitive damages. See HICKS, supra note 26, at 38-47.
118. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 88; Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Roberts, Prod. Liab. Rep.
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brought a demise to the deadly marketing adventure of super-absorbent
tampons." 9
In the tort reform debate, some pharmaceutical representatives have
turned this argument around and contended that punitive damages have
driven perfectly safe, beneficial products off the market. For example, an
attorney for G.D. Searle Co., the manufacturer of the Copper-7 IUD,
testified before the U.S. Senate that the first punitive damages verdict
against this device, and the consequent withdrawal of coverage by the
insurance carrier, led to the demise of this IUD. 120 While it may well be
true that this drastically changed the financial picture facing the Copper-7
and contributed to the decision to withdraw it, the punitive damages verdict
was based on compelling evidence that the company had ignored and
covered up evidence of risks, as well as irresponsibly promoted the device
to a group of women for whom it was medically unadvised.'
2
'
The companies that still market IUDs in the U.S. today have faced few
lawsuits, because they have learned from the mistakes of the past and now
advise that IUDs are not appropriate and safe for all women. Safety data
establishes that IUDs are advisable and safe compared to other options only
for women in long-term mutually monogamous sexual relationships.'22 If
G.D. Searle had been more responsive to this safety evidence than to cost
considerations, then it may well have never had a liability and punitive
damages problem. The overall irony of the argument that litigation costs
drove some IUDs off the market is that "[r]eports of injuries and deaths of
women, which came years before the devices were withdrawn, never had
that effect."',
23
The other favorite example offered by the pharmaceutical industry
concerning the detrimental effect of punitive damages on women's health
is the morning sickness drug Bendectin. Thousands of law suits filed on
behalf of children with birth defects alleged that Bendectin, if taken during
the period of pregnancy when fetal limb formation occurred, caused limb
deformities.'2 4  At the time these lawsuits commenced, very little no
(CCH) 1 14,765, 1996 LEXIS 126 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996). Because the drug is still marketed
for other medical uses, including to treat infertility and Parkinson's disease, it is still possible
for Parlodel to be prescribed to pregnant women. See Michael Unger, Mons Sue Maker of
Antilactation Drug, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1995, at A37.
119. See O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1446.
120. FDA Approval and Limits on Damage Awards: Hearings on S. 672, Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary. 104th Cong. 3-7 (1995) (statement of Janice Toran, Counsel
for G.D. Searle & Co.).
121. See Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1537.
122. PARAGARD, Information Sheet, TODAY'S IUD Is EFFECTIVE, RELIABLE, AND
CONVENIENT (1995) (distributed by Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.); Anita Nelson, Patient
Selection Key to IUD Success, CONTEMP. OB/GYN, Oct. 1995, at 49, 49-50.
123. GRANT, supra note 26, at 147.
124. For the story of Bendectin litigation, see MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND
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epidemiological research on this question had been performed, even though
one of the drug's active ingredients was chemically related to a known
animal teratogen and it had been marketed to pregnant women for
years."'25 The mounting litigation stimulated the scientific research, which
generally did not substantiate the connection with birth defects. 2 6 Thus,
no punitive damages judgment was ever sustained on appeal, and most cases
were dismissed at the outset. Nevertheless, rising insurance costs, public
alarms about the drug's safety, and the declining market for Bendectin led
the manufacturer, Richardson-Merrell, to withdraw it from the market.
27
Proponents of tort reform now lament before Congress that products liability
suits and junk science drove the only known effective treatment for morning
sickness off the market, to the detriment of women's health.121
There are several problems with using Bendectin as a case for curtailing
punitive damages for any FDA approved drug or device. First, the
dangerous drugs and devices that have been driven off the market by
punitive damages far outweigh this one example of a benign drug so
afflicted. As the poster child for tort reform, Bendectin is being asked to
prove too much.'29  Moreover, Bendectin was of questionable effective-
ness for mild cases of morning sickness, and was wildly over prescribed by
physicians in instances where its benefits were equally as unproven as its
risks. 3" As medical and societal concern about the safety and wisdom of
over prescription of drugs during pregnancy increased, growing numbers of
physicians became leery of prescribing it in cases other than those of severe
morning sickness. This salutory caution about overprescriptive unnecessary
drugs to pregnant women was an important factor in drying up the market
BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996), see
also Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Studi' in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 303 (1992).
125. GREEN, supra note 124, at 90-91, 173-76, 228, 329.
126. See id. at 173-75, 314-15, 329-30; Sanders, supra note 124, at 346, 395.
127. See GREEN, supra note 124, at 182-84.
128. See GREEN, supra note 124, at 186-87, 339-40. On the occasions I have testified
before Congress, I have heard several witnesses make such assertions during the question and
answer colloquys. The Products Liability Coordinating Committee ("PLCC"), a defense-
oriented lobbying consortium, created a Women's Issues Task Force which disseminated this
claim about Bendectin. See PLCC Letter to Writers on Women's Issues (Nov. 22, 1993) (on
file with the TennesseeLaw Review); PLCC WOMEN'S ISSUES TASK FORCE POSITION PAPER,
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WOMEN 3 n.3 (Aug. 1993) (on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
129. See, e.g., STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF
PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES xxx-xi( 1993); GREEN, supra note 124, at 339-41
(suggesting that the Bendectin example is sui generis and being overused to fuel most of the
misperceptions and fears of products liability and mass torts).
130. Studies showed that Bendectin was only 10% more effective than a placebo for
relieving morning sickness. See GREEN, supra note 124.
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for the drug and undermining its profitability.' 3 ' The litigation alone
cannot be singled out. To the extent that Bendectin may have been effective
and safe, its active ingredients are available in a combination of an over the
counter antihisthamene and B-6 vitamin. Several physicians advised their
patients to use this less expensive alternative rather than take Bendectin.1
32
Moreover, other substitute drugs are available to treat morning sickness.'33
Thus, the claim that litigation drove the only known treatment for morning
sickness off the market is not accurate.
Another frequently overlooked positive health effect of punitive damages
is their role in alerting the FDA to the need to take stronger action, and to
stimulating further medical research into the health effects of products. The
tort system and the regulatory system have an important synergistic
relationship that could be undermined by the "FDA defense." The Dalkon
Shield litigation, and in particular the punitive damages judgments, were a
powerful inducement to the FDA to investigate and assert its regulatory
authority over the Dalkon Shield.'34 With breast implants, the FDA was
motivated to require more safety data from manufacturers by several large
punitive damages judgments, combined with documents obtained by lawyers
in breast implant litigation that showed high rupture and contracture rates,
internal company knowledge of these risks, and shoddy manufacturing
practices. 135 This belated exercise of regulatory responsibility led the FDA
to conclude that the manufacturers' proof of safety was woefully inadequate,
especially considering the many decades the product had been put in
women, and the FDA ordered a moratorium on the marketing of the product
until safety could be proven. 36  Whatever the eventual outcome of the
ongoing epidemiological research into a possible connection between breast
implants and connective tissue and immune system diseases, we all, and
women in particular, are better off knowing than not knowing. As the FDA
Commissioner noted, if the agency did not step into the fray over breast
131. Id. at 182-83.
132. Id. at 183, 337.
133. Id. at 337.
134. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
135. See David A. Kessler, The Basis ofthe FDA s Decision on Breast Implants, 326
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1713, 1713 (1992).
136. Id. Although Dr. Kessler has been castigated by Dr. Marcia Angell for taking a
paternalistic action that deprived women of choice when there was also no proof that the
devices caused systemic illnesses, see ANGELL, supra note 98, at 19-25, the FDA law places
the burden of proof of safety on the manufacturer. KESSLER, supra note 135, at 1713. The
law has made a policy decision that drugs and devices should not be marketed until proven
safe and effective, rather than the position advocated by Dr. Angell that they should be kept
on the market until proven unsafe. Id. Dr. Kessler noted the long list of known risks and
unanswered questions about the long-term safety of breast implants, id., and observed that
"[c]aveat emptor has never been-and will never be-the philosophy at the FDA." Id. at
1715.
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implants, manufacturers would probably continue to market them for another
thirty years without bothering to undertake basic research into their health
effects.'37 It took tort litigation and punitive damages to move the FDA
to require the research that will eventually better inform the public about
safety.
Breast implants are hardly the only example of a product used in
women's bodies that is marketed for years with insufficient knowledge about
safety and risks. Lawyers and women's health activists aroused concerns
about the safety of high hormone dose birth control pills, and the additional
research stimulated by the pressure led to substantial health improvements
in the drug and far more effective informed consent for women consumers.
Even though the medical research on Bendectin did not bear out the
concerns about an increased risk of birth defects, this is research that
undoubtedly should have been done before the drug was marketed to tens
of thousands of pregnant women. If not for the tort litigation, the medical
research probably never would have been done. From this research, the
medical community has learned more about birth defects and appropriate
periods for prescribing certain kinds of drugs during pregnancy. The
medical community has also learned that more conservative treatment
methods are actually safer and more efficacious.38
DES provides another salient example of the positive effect of tort
litigation in stimulating and supporting activism and medical research. Until
women started bringing and winning lawsuits, many DES exposed women
did not know about the risks they faced. Media interest aroused by legal
judgments helped the activist group DES Action reach more women and, as
DES Action grew in strength, it was able to successfully push the medical
research agenda. Until the first wave of successful lawsuits, little follow up
research had been done to learn about the health effects of DES exposure.
As such research has been done, more and more adverse health effects have
come to light. In addition, physicians and DES exposed women and men
have learned information essential to monitoring and treating the DES
exposed.
Mounting concerns about Norplant, growing litanies of health com-
plaints, and lawsuits from women are starting to stimulate additional
research about this contraceptive. Indeed, the manufacturer is attempting to
devise a new formulation that exposes women to a lower hormone dose for
a shorter period of time.3 9 Still, the list of unanswered health questions
about Norplant, despite risk signals and FDA approval, is alarming. What
are the long-term effects on women who use Norplant for more than five
years? Is it safe for long-term use by women who smoke, or who have high
blood pressure, or who have diabetes, or who are over 40? Can the
137. Id.
138. See GREEN, supra note 124, at 336.
139. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTRACEPTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 100, at 32 1.
[Vol. 64:847
TORT REFORM FOR WOMEN
menstrual disruption caused by Norplant make it harder to detect early
warning signs of reproductive cancers? Why does Norplant increase the risk
of ectopic pregnancy, and how can this risk be reduced? What are the long-
term health effects for babies born to the one in twenty-five Norplant users
who become pregnant during the five year span of the drug? Is this the
next potential DES? Should nursing women be given Norplant? Will
women regain full use of their arm after having surgery to dig out Norplant
capsules that become embedded in their limb? What are the long-term
health effects when some of the rods migrate or become too deeply lodged
to be safely removed, thus remaining in a woman's body far longer than the
anticipated five years? 40 The fact that this drug is being marketed despite
so many serious questions about its health effects may well. arouse .the
indignation of juries. While the drug's manufacturer should have more
thoroughly investigated these health questions before pushing the product on
women, it may again take a punitive damages wake-up call to stimulate
adequate medical research, serious attention to women's reports of problems,
and effective monitoring by the FDA.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of this history of drugs and devices for women, an "FDA
defense" from punitive damages has great potential for undermining what
few incentives currently exist for manufacturers to elevate safety concerns
above marketing and profit concerns. If manufacturers of drugs and medical
devices are insulated from punitive damages, the role the tort system has
played in helping unearth safety problems, drawing public attention to risks,
stimulating increased medical research, and prodding the FDA to respond
to growing evidence of dangers that come to light after initial approval will
be hampered, to the overall detriment of women's health. As Dr. David
Kessler of the FDA has cautioned, "caveat emptor" never should be the
policy for drug safety.' 4 ' Yet extending protection from punitive damages
to drug manufacturers that received previous approval from the FDA, even
though their post-approval conduct meets the legal standard of flagrant
indifference to health and safety, will usher in exactly such a principle.
Women will have little in the way of effective legal recourse with enough
potential financial consequence to force manufacturers to take their health
more seriously from the outset. The women's health community should be
extremely skeptical about legislative proposals that will leave women at the
mercy of the next over-hyped claim about a wonderfully risk free drug or
medical device that will give women the flawless body, the painless
pregnancy, the perfect baby, or the "immaculate" contraception.
140. For these and other unanswered questions and warning signs about Norplant, see
SEAMAN, supra note 26, at 245-46.
141. Kessler, supra note 135, at 1715.
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